




Peter Fraser

Divided We Stand

Scotland a Nation Once Again?

POLITEIA

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POLITEIA

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Foreword

There is a political assumption that whatever the cost the existing union must be maintained. This pamphlet questions that assumption. Amongst all political parties, including the thinkers of the Scottish National Party (SNP), there is a growing agreement that the social union should not be disturbed. I agree that that should be maintained, but it would be more helpful if there were to be even minimal agreement on what the social union is. Loose words make for loose policy.

This pamphlet suggests that there has been confusion over what constitutes social union and little fresh thinking on unionism - regarded as the only solution although all empirical evidence points to a break-up.

There is also a muddle over why the union matters. The assumption that holding the UK together matters especially for maintaining links with international bodies such as the EU, NATO and the UN, has been implied by many, not least by David Cameron. But it has more of an historical flavour than any grasp of the realities of the 21st century. In any event, I am far from persuaded that if there were to be a break-up, that would necessarily be a catalyst for a change in status. Retaining our nuclear capability may be a more relevant consideration.

I would prefer a continuation of the status quo. But, having been a Tory MP in Scotland from 1979 to 1987 and having watched the Conservative Party decline further since then, I am prompted to pause and ask whether there is another way forward for the centre-right in Scotland. Since 1955, when, having had a majority, the Conservative Party abandoned a sectarian stance and embraced all regardless of race or creed, it has spiralled downwards. Not even the overt support by a Roman Catholic bishop stemmed the haemorrhage.

In 1979 there were no fewer than 22 MPs out of a possible 71 in Scotland and it was possible to drive from the Highlands to the Borders going exclusively through Tory territory. Edinburgh was the most Conservative city in the United Kingdom. With the addition of two more MPs in 1983, Anna McCurley and Michael Forsyth, we seemed impregnable, but the sad fate of Hamish Gray in Ross and Cromarty that same year should have alerted us to a seismic shift underway beyond the misplaced siting of an aluminium smelter in the Highlands. By the mid 1990s we had only one Tory in Scotland and still only have that in 2011.

Is there a way back? That is doubtful, even with a name change. Beyond a handful of Conservative seats which might be regained in Scotland, there is virtually no prospect of an overall majority even with the number of seats reduced. There is a very strong argument that Conservative principles are shaped by the economic thesis propounded by such Scottish geniuses as Adam Smith and are reflected in the savings ratios in such places as Forfar in Angus. Though that tradition would be the envy of most of Europe or the United States, the Conservative Party, despite being guided more than any others by Scottish virtues, is too often caricatured in Scotland as 'The English Party'.

It is time to think radically on the centre-right in Scotland. What troubles me is that within England there is a growing mood that England bears the brunt of the pain in hard economic times while the Celtic fringe is molly-coddled. It is not the purpose of this pamphlet to engage in the rights or wrongs of that argument, but to recognise that the mood of England is shifting. But for that Celtic fringe it is unlikely that there would ever again be a Labour Government for the United Kingdom and, with the exception of a handful of Hampstead trendies, the Labour Party in England would be marginalised as only a northern and regional party and never again as a national one. That is a proposition not unattractive to English Tories. It is a dangerous assumption, but one carrying considerable weight at Westminster.

I

Setting the Scene*

Scotland's relations with the UK are poised for change. But few can predict how fast or how far the thread binding Scotland to the UK will unravel. On the one hand the three main parties at Westminster plan a limited transfer of powers to Scotland as part of the UK under the Coalition's Scotland Bill, shortly to become law. However, north of the border the Scottish National Party is pledged to a referendum at least on full independence.

The Scotland Bill, now reaching its final stages in Parliament, proposes devolution of greater financial responsibility, some tax raising powers and the transfer of certain powers over justice and policing. Once the Bill becomes law, Scotland will have greater fiscal powers with authority to raise around 35 per cent of its budget (a level common in devolved legislatures such as Belgium, Spain, and Australia), instead of 15 per cent as now; a Scottish income tax will replace part of the UK income tax and Scotland will have other tax raising powers, e.g. over stamp duty, land and landfill taxes; Scotland will have new borrowing powers, a cash reserve and the prospect of further tax devolution. The measure follows Labour's earlier 1998 Act which initially set up the Scottish Parliament, the Calman Commission to assess the working of the Act and envisages further devolution. Meanwhile the UK will deduct 10p from standard and upper rates of income tax in Scotland and the Scottish Parliament will decide on a new amount added to each of the rates, basic, higher and additional. The bloc grant to Scotland, currently around £2bn, would be reduced and the measures phased in from 2013.

But the Scots look unlikely to accept the plan from Westminster and the UK parties seem out of their depth. North of the border, the SNP, which has more seats in the Scottish Parliament (68 out of a possible 129) than the traditional parties combined remains pledged at least to a referendum on full independence, initially promised by the SNP and its leader Alex Salmond, Scotland's First Minister since May 2007. The referendum on the future status of Scotland is to include the option of independence. The initial proposal – in the Scottish Executive's White Paper, *Choosing Scotland's Future: A National Conversation* (August 2007) – outlined a range of options from further and extensive devolution (including powers currently reserved for Westminster such as defence and foreign policy) to complete independence. For independence, the United Kingdom Parliament 'must cease to have competence to legislate for Scotland' and the UK government would cease to have competence in respect of executive action in Scotland. Scotland's Parliament and

*I would like to thank Dr Sheila Lawlor for her help with this chapter.

Government would take over the full range of competencies. For such a course the White Paper suggests an Act of Parliament renouncing UK competence to legislate for Scotland would be necessary, and Scottish constituencies would no longer be represented in the Commons. The Queen would remain Head of State in Scotland, and Scotland would become monarchical and within the United Kingdoms.

The proposed referendum and the SNP's advocacy of independence as the best option for Scotland, has remained the focus of the SNP's constitutional policy. The Party certainly has support for such a course in Scotland: having gone to the electorate in 2011 promising legislation for a referendum it was returned to the Scottish Parliament as the largest party, winning seats from the Scottish Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties, all of which are unionist along with their Westminster equivalents.

Recent focus has been on the referendum: how it will be organized; how the questions will be put; legal or constitutional legitimacy; practical matters of who should organize it and the nature of the questions put to the voters. In Scotland doubt has been cast on the legitimacy of a referendum under Scotland's auspices by constitutional or legal specialists who warn that Scotland does not have the authority for such a course. Questions have been raised over whether the Scottish Parliament could organise the referendum and warnings given that even an advisory referendum would fall outside the Scottish Government's powers and that the UK Government, not the Scottish Government, should call the referendum, which should be run by the Electoral Commission.¹

Alex Salmond has, however, made clear that the referendum should be organized by the Scottish Parliament and that voters will be given the option of maximum devolution (devo-max) and independence – despite the doubts raised on constitutional legality by specialists north of the border. Despite pressure from the Prime Minister for an early referendum, Mr. Salmond intends to stick with the plan to hold a referendum during the second half of the current parliament, and his party insist that the timing is for Scotland, not Westminster.²

The most recent consultation paper, *Your Scotland, Your Referendum*, indicates that the referendum, which will be in autumn 2014, will be preceded by a White Paper in 2013 setting out the Scottish Government's proposals.³ Meanwhile the paper reiterates

¹ By Aidan O'Neill, QC, a lawyer and Scottish Nationalist supporter and Professor Adam Tomkins, Glasgow University respectively *The Scotsman*, 14 November 2011.

² *Scotland on Sunday*, 13 November 2011.

³ *Your Scotland, Your Referendum- A Consultation Document*, January 2012
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/01/1006>.

that under independence, Scotland would have the rights and responsibilities of a sovereign state.

At the moment therefore, stalemate looks likely. The main parties across the entirety of the UK north and south of the border, Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat, are unionist and support the current Scotland Bill, without, it seems, an alternative scheme and unwilling to anticipate the implications of a referendum campaign or vote. Their focus tends now to be on the mechanics and timing of the proposed referendum. Scottish Labour politicians would support a 'Clarity Act' defining the terms for a referendum, to ensure that the poll is both legally secure and that a clear question is put in terms of seceding from the UK.⁴ The Scottish Conservative leader, Ruth Davidson, would oppose granting powers beyond those in the Scotland Bill, urging that the date is set, the questions clearly put and legally sound.⁵

Apart from the public forays to press for an early vote at Westminster, it appears to be business as usual with the 2010 bill now at its Committee stage in the Lords. Formally the Prime Minister maintains that the Scotland Bill will transfer significant extra powers to Holyrood, giving responsibility for raising billions of pounds to the Scottish Parliament and so meet the demands of the Scottish people for more say over how Scotland is run, and clear the way for a clear-cut referendum on 'yes or no' to Scotland in Britain.⁶

⁴ *Scotland on Sunday*, 13 November 2011.

⁵ BBC News, 7 November 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-15622720>.

⁶ BBC News, 7 November, 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-15622720>.

II

Proportionate Populations: What Are the Constitutional Implications?

It is surprisingly difficult to obtain precise figures on population, but the population of England is already over 51 million and likely to rise to about 63 million by 2029. The population of Scotland is about 5.1 million and, immigration apart, unlikely to increase significantly. The population of Wales is about 3 million and more or less static, as is Northern Ireland where the population is around 1.75 million. The situation in the Republic of Ireland, in terms of population figures, is catastrophic - about 3.9 million and falling following the recent economic crisis in that country.

This is not, however, a treatise on population and some of the figures may be challenged, but if we take Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland together that total remains massively below the population of England actual or projected. England would have in excess of 85 per cent of the population of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in or around 2029.

Population weight matters because of spending power. It is a significant factor unless one or more of the minority nations has a greater spending power than numbers imply. Scotland is an unusual model here. Whereas oil revenue is now proportionately high, the same cannot be said about the future picture. Even if North Sea oil revenues were to be 100 per cent exclusively attributed to Scotland, no one can be certain of the value of that by 2030 nor what would be the duration of the oil province beyond that date. Exports of Scotch Whisky to an affluent world are worth a huge amount (in excess of £120 a second)⁷ but the industry in Scotland is not that significant an employer, directly employing no more than 10,000 people across Scotland, no more than a tiny proportion of the workforce.⁸

The proportionate figures for population can have constitutional significance, especially in a federal arrangement which might be illuminating for Scotland. Both Rhode Island and California have two senators, though the population of Rhode Island is marginally over 1 million whilst the population of California is over 37 million and rising. That would scarcely seem equitable but that equality owes more to historical

⁷ BBC News, 2 December 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-15995924>.

⁸ 'The Economic Impact of Scotch Whisky Production in Scotland', Scotch Whisky Association, May 2011, <http://www.scotch-whisky.org.uk/swa/files/EconomicImpactReportMay2010.pdf>.

accident than logic. Rhode Island was one of the original thirteen breakaway states. California was not admitted to the Union until 1850. If a new federation were to be formed today, it is likely that a more proportionate representation would be introduced.

Given the population imbalance between England and Scotland, where one prospective partner is so dominant, a federal solution is probably unworkable in the 21st century. Furthermore there is no appetite within England to break up that country to form a more balanced federation. With the exception of the odd druidically inclined Wessexman there is no desire for the breakup of England. Indeed the abject failure of the recent Labour Government to establish regional assemblies with lesser powers than fully-fledged federal units confirms any such proposal would be a non-starter.

Having recognised the demographic reality, what then are the options when the status quo points only to disaster?

Any argument in favour of a federal solution ought to be considered in the context of such population assessments. But the argument for federation does not hold water: it seems unlikely that the Republic of Ireland might agree to be a part of a federal Britain though it is possible that Northern Ireland might wish to join the Republic of Ireland. This would have little effect on the population dominance of England.

Meanwhile in England opinion polls suggest the support for an independent Scotland exceeds 41 per cent and is rising whereas in Scotland itself the real support for that option hovers lower.⁹ In any event there is a marked difference between the two. Sometimes, depending on the question put, it is in the upper thirty per cent range, but support is capable of plummeting much lower.

I do not find the status of an English client state a particularly attractive one but is the straight alternative between an unchanged unionism or separatism particularly attractive? I doubt it.

⁹13 May 2011 <http://labs.yougov.co.uk/news/2011/05/13/scottish-vote/>.

III

Economic Union or Social Union – Loose Terms Make For Loose Policy

What exactly is meant by the distinction between the economic union and the social union? This seems to me to be even more fundamental and important than trying to grasp what is meant by the glib phrase of ‘devo max’. Yet it is the fashion amongst the thinkers and philosophers of the SNP to talk unequivocally of the disruption of the economic union with England and yet to want to leave undisturbed the social union with England.

Let us consider the social union. It is not clear what the social union means. Does it mean that a resident in Scotland before heading off on a package holiday from an English airport has a quiet drink and stays overnight with his cousin in England and then reciprocates over Hogmanay? Or does it include, for example, the great University of Glasgow sending its brightest and best law graduates on scholarships to study at Oxford? They do not instantly become emigres but return to Scotland enriched with knowledge and become among the great contributors to Scots law. Medicine, engineering and genetics, inter alia, will have comparable examples and we need to tease out exactly where the line is to be drawn.

When we come to the economic union, a number of interesting points are raised. The figures for Scotland’s fiscal arrangements are difficult to establish. That given for Total Managed Expenditure for Scotland is around £62 billion – around one tenth of the UK’s at £669 billion (figures for 2009-10).¹⁰ Revenues, which are mostly collected by Her Majesty’s Government (HMG), are more difficult to calculate and subject to variation, for example depending on whether revenue from oil is exclusively attributable to Scotland.

Public spending is allocated by HMG on the basis of the complex formula devised to redistribute funding to different parts of the United Kingdom taking into account social and economic factors in each area. So the per capita spending for Scotland is £9,940, that for the Northwest (areas bordering Scotland) is £9,229 and that for South East, £7,481 and the average for England is £8,531.¹¹

¹⁰ Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland, 2009-10
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/06/21144516/5#t34>.

¹¹ ‘Public Expenditure: Statistical Analyses 2011’, HM Treasury, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pesa_2011_complete.pdf.

Whether an independent Scotland could be self financing, and whether the revenues raised in Scotland could offset Scotland's public spending, remain a matter of opinion. Much depends on which figures are taken into account (e.g. oil revenues or the cost of ageing). One estimate suggests that total current revenue for Scotland, including North Sea Revenue on a per capita basis is £42,747m or 8.3 per cent of total UK revenue, or if estimated as a geographical share would be £48,132m (geographical share) or 9.4 per cent of total UK revenue.¹²

The late Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish and I sought to argue in the House of Lords that there was not a homogeneity in the British economy and that if the South-East economy were to overheat with interest rates consequences, it did not necessarily follow that Scotland or the North of England were doing likewise. On the contrary it is not difficult to think of times when far from dampening down demand, the North needed stimulus. Our proposal was that those on the Monetary Committee of the Bank of England should reflect that difference but our views were dismissed by the then Labour Government.

Whether we like it or not, the Scottish economy is not the same as that of London. Nor is the Scottish economy the same as Aberdeen. No Scot should aim to pull down London as the world centre of finance. Not least that would damage Scotland which, with its close and intimate relations with London, continues in managed wealth to punch well above its weight – arguably some 17 per cent above its population ratio.

A new unionism needs to recognise that not everything is to be bent to suit the City of London.

¹²Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland, 2009-10
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/06/21144516/5#t34>.

IV

Defence: Scotland a War Zone?

Scotland has traditionally played a strong role in UK defence, something which initially the SNP seemed keen to stop. Now there appears to be a fundamental shift underway. Therefore, what should guide defence policy?

At one time the argument was that Scotland should disengage from the British Army, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. What Scotland would have was little or no army, no airforce and but a few fishery protection vessels in its navy. I breathe a sigh of relief that there now appears to be a change of thinking. I would not wish my beloved Scotland to be a war zone for those with evil intent on the sovereignty of England. That was, however, the risk. If we totally failed to defend ourselves alone or in conjunction with England, we offered up ourselves as the battleground. We should start from the proposition: NEMO ME IMPUNE LACESSIT: No one attacks us with impunity.

Frankly, post Cold War I do not see who might have evil intentions against England but like others I missed the import of the Balkan crisis and the worldwide ramifications of 9/11 and would hesitate to gaze into the crystal ball and predict the crises even in the rest of the century. All I would argue is that the 20th century should have taught us never to let your guard down.

There seems to me to be much to negotiate over. Defence could play an important part in reaching a settlement more satisfactory to unionists than now seems likely. Unfortunately, so far unionists have singularly failed to grasp the traditional and regimental loyalties in Scotland. Instead they have achieved that extraordinary whammy of alienating unionists in Scotland who have deep regimental loyalties!

A Prime Minister in Downing Street or a Chancellor of the Exchequer or Defence Secretary might regard the investment in Faslane on the Clyde (relatively close to Glasgow, the largest centre of population in Scotland) as a stranded one. In other words they might dismiss it as being no longer worth the cost of a separate operations overhead. This is particularly so now that the Scottish Government seems to be giving the nod to a vast offshore wind farm off Kintyre (at the mouth of the Clyde) thus hindering access to the Atlantic for our nuclear submarines based at Faslane. However he or she could put that nuclear fleet and what remains of the Home Fleet in Scapa Flow. That is not so daft considering what was done in World War I and World War II, particularly the construction of the four causeways (the Churchill Barriers) to provide a naval defence and connect the Orkney Isles.

Moving the home fleet could be popular in the northern isles, who have never really seen themselves part of Scotland, and would welcome the Royal Navy base. Indeed, in the last (2010) election, neither Orkney nor Shetland voted for the nationalists. A future agreement might be that the northern isles remain part of the UK with their oil and gas fields being defended by the Royal Navy. That would be devastating in the short term to Scotland's tax take when those oil fields in mainland Scottish waters are already in terminal decline, unlike those of Orkney and Shetland.¹³

The other careful points of an independence negotiation, leaving aside the vexed issue of public sector pensions, would be the status of RAF bases and army bases. As previously identified, the Scottish population is about 8.5 per cent of the UK total. Does that mean that Scotland picks up the bill for about 8.5 per cent of expenditure in Scotland or worldwide? The thinking seems to focus on the former. However, the emphasis might need to be on the latter. Otherwise any bases in Scotland will be sovereign English, as in Akrotiri in Cyprus or the USA as in Guantanamo Bay. Neither seems a very comfortable solution.

¹³ At present the population of the islands is something over 22,000 and the islands of Orkney have a population of 20,000.

V Client States*

Think of King Herod, and Biblical associations come to mind. But for a student of political history, Herod is interesting for a different reason. He was an important part of an ingenious system of devolved provincial government created by the ancient Romans, as the client king of Judaea.

Rome, especially in the first centuries BC and AD, did not only occupy and directly rule foreign lands. Beyond the limits of the provinces (*provinciae*) under direct Roman control was a buffer zone of friendly kingdoms like Herod's Judaea, allied with Rome and under Roman influence, but nominally independent. Their relationship and that of their rulers with Rome was such that some historians refer to them as 'client states'.¹⁴

The states in question were located mostly in Syria and the near east, with the addition of Mauretania in Africa. Their rulers were monarchs with titles like 'ethnarch', 'tetrarch' or simply 'king'. The client king, and perhaps some other local elites, essentially colluded with the Roman powers, exchanging a portion of their country's autonomy for the right to continue ruling.

This model was drawn from the traditional Roman idea of patron-client relationships, where a patron provided rewards (*beneficia*) to his client in exchange for services (*officia*). In return for loyalty and efficiency, client rulers received honours like Roman citizenship and extra territory. For example, in 24-23 BC Herod was granted a portion of Ituraea (near Galilee) by the Emperor Augustus.

The relationship was not a simple matter of service and reward, however. While titles granted to client kings like 'friend of the Roman people' (*amicus populi Romani*) may have masked reality of Roman dominance, there were strong ties of culture and friendship between Roman elites and the client kings. Herod's grandson Agrippa I, for example, was educated at Rome. He was a close personal friend of the emperors Claudius and Caligula, the latter of whom appointed him king of several parts of his grandfather's former kingdom.

Client states had their own taxation systems, and spent their own revenues. Their rulers were free to govern internal affairs largely as they wished. The states would issue their own coinage alongside that of Rome, emblazoned with a portrait of their

*I would like to thank Maximus Marenbon for this chapter.

¹⁴ Eg. Luttwak, E., *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, Baltimore 1976, 20ff.

monarch. Most issued coins only in bronze, but the Nabatean kingdom, in southern Transjordan, issued coins in silver as well.¹⁵ They traded extensively with Rome but as a financially independent partner.

However, the client states' foreign policy was strictly linked to that of Rome. Not only serving as a first line of defence against external threats, which would reach their borders before reaching territory under direct Roman rule, they also provided auxiliary troops that served alongside the regular Roman army (normally light troops, *auxilia*). As well as being drawn into Roman offensives, client states were subject to rules governing their own foreign affairs. For example, no client state was allowed to attack another client state without permission from Rome. If attacked by a fellow-client, only defensive measures were permitted to be used. In this way a rough stability was maintained on Rome's eastern borders.

This system was of great importance for the Roman Empire, which at this period was more hegemonic than territorial. The presence of allied client kingdoms at Rome's border essentially extended her territory without necessitating a larger military defence force or the costly bureaucracy of provincial administration. The value of the client states to Rome is demonstrated by the fact that when the soon-to-be Emperor Augustus defeated Antony at Actium, he confirmed the rule of six major client kings who had served his opponent, rather than taking revenge on them.¹⁶

What lessons can modern governments draw from ancient Rome and its client states? There are two radical and related differences that must be addressed before any attempt to apply the model to small nations on the borders of a larger one. However, if the appropriate changes can be made, it is possible that this ancient model of diplomacy could provide some inspiration for us in the present day.

First, today such a relationship would have to be one between equals with equality between large powers and their smaller neighbours, whereas Rome was not trying to establish an equal relationship with its clients. Thus in any kind of modern version of this relationship, the respective powers of each state would be formally agreed and the larger state would not have authority to interfere in the politics of the smaller one. It could not take up the Roman habit of appointing or dismissing client governments as desired. Moreover, certain responsibilities would be mutual, such as defence (and offence). The larger state could not simply leave the smaller one to defend itself in case of attack: troops drawn from the smaller state would be entitled to serve not just as auxiliaries but in the armed forces of the larger state, with all the same benefits and pay, not as conscripts but as volunteers.

¹⁵ Butcher, K., *Roman Syria and the Near East*, London 2003, 97.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 30.

Second, in a modern democracy the people are sovereign, whereas in an ancient client state the monarch was sovereign. This is an important difference, because it means that the exchange of benefits between Rome and the local elites in a client state could be transformed today into a genuinely beneficial relationship between the democratic peoples of the smaller and larger nation. Today each nation would confer all the benefits of citizenship on the people of the other, just as Rome's emperors gave Roman citizenship to the client kings. There would be free trade between the two nations, and they might wish, as in Roman times, to have two separate currencies used concurrently.

What, in practical terms would the analogy be for Scotland today? Relations between England, the larger power, and Scotland, the smaller would be on the basis of equality, with each power benefitting from close association with the other. Respective powers over defence, economic and fiscal matters, foreign affairs and domestic powers would be formally agreed. These could be on a mutual or shared arrangement, or vested in one or other power.

The benefits of such an arrangement could be manifold. Scotland would have the dignity of independence, and the benefits of raising local taxes to spend on local problems. England would be spared on the one hand the impracticality of governing the smaller, and on the other, the inconvenience of having a surly neighbour at its doorstep. Both nations would flourish in an equal friendship, which recognized their differences and their autonomies, but benefited each.

V Conclusion

It is my contention that even a superficial examination of the issues around secession reveals that they are immensely complex. Given the massive and increasing dominance of the population in England, vague references to federation lead only to cloudy thoughts. Having said that, I am not persuaded that the outcome of the referendum will be settled on details and rational argument as opposed to emotion.

David Cameron has raised the stakes and has Scotland galloping to the brink. It is a well-intentioned but high-risk strategy. In the 2010 general election, almost every sitting member increased his or her majority, thus showing the innate conservatism of Scotland.

It is my view that the Scottish question will not be settled on the bases of existing unionism but that a change in direction is needed.

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Scotland's relations with the UK are poised for change. The Scottish National Party wants full independence. But south of the Border, the Westminster parties back greater powers for Scotland but within the United Kingdom.

In *Divided We Stand* the author, who has served as Solicitor General for Scotland and Lord Advocate, considers the implications of the two options. Neither, he suggests, takes due account of the complexities or opportunities for a settlement. Against the dramatic change of national sentiment in Scotland, with ever dwindling support for the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, there are complex questions as well as common interests. Lord Fraser considers the balance of populations, social and economic ties and defence.

He suggests that the Roman idea of 'client states', suitably updated for modern democracies, could help provide a model for a relationship between two distinct, but closely linked, self-determining nations, in which respective powers over foreign, defence and economic matters are formally agreed.

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